# Palestinian's popular rampage and Israeli security

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## Abstract:

This study aims to analyze the impact of the 'Palestinian's popular rampage' (PPR) on Israeli security to seek out wherein Israel adhered to its old security strategies through which it dealt with the previous Al Aqsa Intifada and where it worked to change its security strategy towards its handling of the Palestinian's popular rampage. Relying in this regard on the approach of continuity and change. The study concluded that the Palestinian's popular rampage (PPR) posed a serious challenge to Israel's internal and economic security. Significantly, Israel was keen to protect its internal security so it was interested in changing some aspects of its old security strategy through which it dealt with the Al-Aqsa Intifada; yet it continued in other parts to depend on it. One of the foremost necessary aspects that Israel has modified in its old security strategy was the use of technology to meet the requirements of time and to attain its security. It utilized technology in its newly adapted security strategy using cameras for the first time at checkpoints; social networks were also exploited to spy on Palestinians. The Israeli army in this respect had posted its security strategy on its website to reassure the Israeli public. Furthermore, Israel changed its old security strategy by introducing the counterattack, as well as replacing its old "cauterization of conscience" strategy that is based on collective punishment; wherein it attempted to solely maintain this rampage in the individual framework to solely punish the Palestinians who attempt to stab Israelis so that the effect does not extend to the rest of the Palestinians. One aspect that Israel kept in its old security strategy is closed checkpoints and intensify security precautions during Jewish holidays.

**Keywords**: Continuity and change, Palestinian's popular rampage, Security Strategy.

## Introduction:

This study seeks to analyze the impact of the 'Palestinian's popular rampage' (PPR) on Israeli security. The latter meant a large-scale response which was launched in October 2015, continued sporadically until 2016, and came spontaneously without prior planning, often through individual Palestinians' actions. The study is important because it addresses one of the political events from the Palestinian issue, called the "popular rampage", in the absence of studies addressing it. However of the fact that it deals with a period representing about two years, it documents a new type of resistance. Relating to that, the study set out to address the issue arising from the theoretical disagreement between those who

consider that Israel had followed the same security strategy that it used in previous uprisings, and those who believe that Israel had modified its security strategy in dealing with them. Hence, the problem that the study addresses is whether there had been a change in Israel's security strategy after the popular rampage that started in 2015 compared to the Al-Aqsa Intifada that started in 2000.

In order for the study to answer its main question: what is the impact of the Palestinian's popular rampage on Israeli Security? It relied on the approach of change and continuity, which is one of the approaches used in political science. The latter approach is widely used to determine the extent to which a country's foreign policy has

changed or continued[1]; however, there is also a tendency from security studies to pay attention to this approach to find out the extent to which a country's defense plans have changed or continued[2]. As a matter of fact, this approach is the most appropriate to analyze the Palestinian's popular rampage on Israeli security via which it is possible to know where Israel was able to continue to follow the same security strategy that followed in the Al-Aqsa Intifada, and where it changed its security strategy. Accordingly, the study followed specific procedures, including comparing Israel's security strategy in dealing with the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. Another measure that helped analyze the impact of the Palestinian's popular rampage on Israeli Security is by tracking news, reports, opinion polls, and statistics during the period of the Palestinian's popular rampage (2015-late 2016).

The study is divided into two main axes: The first axis deals with the Palestinian's popular rampage in terms of its launch and names, its main characteristics, and its effects on Israeli security. The second axis deals with the impact of Palestinian's popular rampage on the Israeli security strategy, in terms of clarifying the concept of the strategy, as well as its impact on the Israeli security strategy.

## I.    The popular rampage: Its Beginning and Characteristics

In this axis, the meaning of the popular rampage will be clarified, and this will be done by addressing its launch and names, and main characteristics.

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[1]  Laura Neack et al., **Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation**, (New Jersey.: Prentice Hall College Div, 1995).

[2]  Richarad L. Kugler, **New Directions in U.S. National Security Strategy, Defense Plans, and Diplomacy: A Review of Official Strategic Documents**, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2011), p. 150.

[3] The State of the Occupied Capital, **Al-Aasema Newspaper**, June 10, 2015, p. 32.

## 1.1 The launch of popular rampage and its names:

The popular rampage started in 2015 in the West Bank and continued in 2016, reaching its peak in the last two months of 2015 and the first months of 2016. However, its peak gradually began to decline at the end of 2016. As for the events that led to its launch, they are numerous, but the main ones are:

1. On June 3, settlers kidnapped and burned the Jerusalemite child Muhammad Abu Khdeir[3].

2. Settlers burned down the Dawabsheh family home in Duma village on July 31, 2015, and most of the family members died from the fire, including the infant Ali Saeed Dawabsheh (aged one and a half years)[4]

3. In September 2015, the Israeli side conducted a series of cases in the direction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque; We recall that on the ninth of September 2015, the Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon signed an order banning the two organizations "Al-Mourabitat and Al-Mourabitat" and "Students of the Mastabat of Knowledge" in Al-Aqsa[5]. On 14 September, four days after the two organizations were banned, confrontations erupted between the worshipers in Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Israeli occupation police after they forcibly removed the worshipers for the settlers to enter the courtyards of Al-Aqsa Mosque[6].

4. The speech of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to the United Nations on the 30th of September 2015, in which the President declared that the status quo was unsustainable. He called on Israel to assume its responsibilities as an occupying power, and that the Palestinian

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[4] Settlers burn the Dawabshe family alive, **Al-Ayyam newspaper**, August 1, 2015, p. 1.

[5] The Occupation Announces "Al-Mourabitoun and Al-Mourabitat" and "Students of the Mastabat of Knowledge" in "Al-Aqsa" are prohibited organizations, **Al-Ayyam Newspaper**, September 10, 2015, p. 1.

[6] The occupation turns Al-Aqsa into a battlefield to facilitate settlers' incursions, **Al-Ayyam newspaper**, September 14, 2015, p. 1.

Authority will not abide by the agreements as long as Israel refuses to abide by them[7]. About a week before his speech, the president had warned of the outbreak of a rampage over the continued Israeli attacks on the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the continuation of settlements[8].

5. The Israeli occupation forces launched a wide security campaign in East Jerusalem after claiming to thwart several attempts to carry out stabbing attacks by Palestinians against Israelis[9].

Numerous and incalculable Israeli violations against Palestinians, which formed the basis for their failure to comply with the Palestinian-Israeli agreements contributed to repeated stabbings and run-over attacks by Palestinians against Israeli military personnel and settlers. Per contra, Jewish Israelis stabbed Palestinians and even carried out field executions of those for attempting to carry out similar attacks. Among the perpetrators of the stabbing operations were two Arab nationals, Kamel Hasan, a Sudanese national, who was the perpetrator of the Ashkelon attack, who stabbed an Israeli soldier [10], and Saeed al-Omar, who held Jordanian nationality [11].

Through this, the most prominent means used in this uprising are mainly focused on the use of knife stabbings. According to the operations carried out by Palestinian citizens against Israelis, this uprising was called "the popular rampage". While some preferred to call it the Jerusalem Intifada, given the fact that the largest percentage of stabbings, run-over attacks, and shootings against

Israelis were in Jerusalem[12]. Others preferred to call it a popular rampage due to many expectations that it is just a passing rampage that will not last long[13].

Regardless of its various names ranging from popular rampage to the Jerusalem Intifada, the means that were used in this rampage focused mainly on stabbing, run-over attacks, and sometimes individual shootings. They did not reach the level of bombing buses and cafes that characterized the previous Al-Aqsa Intifada, and it differs from the first intifada in 1987 whose methods varied from the use of stones, slingshots, Molotov cocktails, etc.

## 1.2 The most important characteristics of Palestinian's popular rampage:

There are several characteristics that characterize this rampage that can be summarized as follows:

### 1.2.1 Spontaneity:

Its spontaneity is intended not to be planned or to adopt any political organization or through any political decision. Some Palestinian writers described this movement as "an orphan wave with no command, no organization, no purpose; and no mind to direct it[14]." The Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen summarizes the reasons for the outbreak of this movement, which are the new generation's sense of despair over the two-State solution, the proliferation of Israeli barriers, settlement, and the apartheid wall, as well as daily attacks on the Al-Aqsa Mosque. Describing what

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[7] The President: We will not abide by the agreements as long as Israel refuses to abide by them, **Al-Ayyam newspaper**, October 1, 2015, p.1.

[8] The President warns of the outbreak of an intifada because of Al-Aqsa: Israel must stop settlements and its practices in Jerusalem, **Al-Ayyam newspaper**, September 23, 2015, p. 1.

[9] Major Israeli security operation in East Jerusalem, **BBC**, October 14, 2015, available at: https://2u.pw/LjU4M (Accessed at July 1, 2021).

[10] Ashkelon attacker is a Sudanese citizen, **The Times of Israel**, February 7, 2016, available at https://2u.pw/QkeGs (Accessed at, July 1, 2021).

[11] Four Martyrs in Less than 24 Hours, **Ajyal Broadcasting Network**, September 17, 2016,

available at: http://www.arn.ps/archives/186044 (Accessed at July 1, 2021).

[12] Map of Al-Quds Intifada operations in numbers: Hebron and Al-Quds in the lead, **Palestine Today News Agency**, July 20, 2016, available at https://paltoday.ps/ar/post/275450 (Accessed at July 2, 2021).

[13] Nasser Ismail Al-Yafawi, an intifada or a public rampage? A political reading in terms of conflicting terms and interests, **Dunya Al-Watan newspaper**, November 7, 2015, available at: https://2u.pw/y8i4Tl (Accessed at July 9, 2021).

[14] Hani Al-Masr, why the public outburst? **Al-Ayyam newspaper**, December 1, 2015, p. 13.

is happening in the occupied bank, President Abu Mazen said: "it is a justified popular and popular rampage against the occupation, and I do not want anyone to claim that he is the one who drove them out[15]."

An opinion poll indicated that 60% in the West Bank and 75% in the Gaza Strip believe that if the current confrontations turned into an armed uprising, this would achieve the Palestinian rights that the negotiations failed to achieve[16]. Therefore, they still support the return to an armed uprising[17]. Another poll indicated that 64% of the respondents support resorting to nonviolent and unarmed popular resistance, while 48% support the return to an armed uprising[18].

### 1.2.2 Unexpected results:

This popular rampage is characterized by the fact that its results are unpredictable and its course cannot be forecasted. Additionally, the stabbings were unexpected for the Israeli side because they proceeded intermittently and not continuously, which gave a strong indication that there is no

hope of a continuing security calm that could be enjoyed by the Israeli side.

### 1.2.3 Bloodier:

This popular rampage is bloodier than the previous ones, as there are a large number of Palestinians who died in this movement in a very short time. According to the Palestinian Ministry of Health, the occupation soldiers killed about 72 martyrs, including 15 children, and wounded 2,240 Palestinians only during one month, which was October of the year 2015[19]. This can be explained by the instructions received by the Israeli soldiers and the Israeli police to use live bullets and snipers against Palestinian demonstrators[20]. As evidence of the violation of Palestinians' human security[21], Israel's violations of Palestinian human security and the right to life increased. Palestinians' lack of self-security in moving between Palestinian cities had also increased; this is because settlers attacked them all the time by unexpectedly throwing stones at Palestinian cars[22]. This rampage was a war of revenge; the Israeli settler considered all

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[15] 66% of the Palestinians support the militarization of the "popular rampage," **Lebanese News**, Issue 2766, Tuesday December 15, 2015, https://2u.pw/rT8wl, (Accessed at July 3, 2021).

[16] **Results of Poll No. (59)**, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, March 21, 2016, available at: http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/p59%20full%20Arabic.pdf (Accessed at June 25, 2021)

[17] **Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No ،(60)** Palestinian Center for POLICY and SURVEY, June 7. 2016, available at: https://2u.pw/diunS, (Accessed at July 3, 2021)

[18] **Results of Poll No. (61)**, September 2016, the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, available at: http://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Poll-61-Arabic%20Full%20Text%20%  20desgine.pdf (Accessed at November 11, 2021)

[19] Ministry of Health: 72 martyrs and 2,240 wounded last month, **Al-Ayyam newspaper**, November 1, 2015, p. 4.

[20] The occupation approves today facilitating the firing of live bullets at demonstrators, **Palestine**

**Today News** Agency, July 20, 2015, available at: https://paltoday.ps/ar/post/248397 (Accessed at August 15, 2021)

[21] The concept of "human security" was promoted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in its various reports, including its report in 1994, which defined it as: "freedom from fear and freedom from want", describing it as: "safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, and oppression, as well as protection from sudden harmful disturbances in daily life patterns, whether in homes, jobs or societies." With women, children, the displaced, workers and torturers, so that human security is linked to the protection of his rights and freedoms and not limited to external attacks or threats thats threaten the security of the state only that are included in the concept of national security. Look:
Shahrbanou Tadjbakash, Anuradha M. Chenoy, **Human Security: Concept and Implications**, (Oxan: Routledge, 2007), p.24.

[22] Israeli violations during the month of October 2016, **Wafa News Agency website**, (b, c) https://info.wafa.ps/ar_page.aspx?id=jRC27sa11 300163369ajRC27s. (Accessed at June 23, 2021).

Palestinians a target for him\her and they wanted to take revenge, wherein from a security perspective, the war of revenge has no rules or regulations. In addition, the feeling of insecurity and fear of the Palestinians at the checkpoints increased in this rampage compared to the previous ones, because any settler or soldier can easily accuse any Palestinian citizen of wanting to carry out a stabbing attack. Moreover, following any stabbing attack, the Israeli soldiers close the checkpoints.

### 1.2.4 International sympathy for the Palestinians has declined:

Another characteristic of this rampage is the decline in international sympathy with the Palestinians in favor of sympathy with the Israelis. While the symbolic image of the first intifada was the stone in front of the tanks that earned the Palestinians more sympathy and admiration, the symbolic image of the popular rampage was embodied in the stabbing operations against the Israelis; that according to the Israeli media was terrorism against them[23]. This characteristic of the decline of international sympathy with the Palestinians is similar to the Al-Aqsa Intifada; as the martyrdom operations and the bus bombings decreased the international sympathy for the Palestinians and increased it for the Israelis. The Israelis exploited the issue of international sympathy with Israel during the Al-Aqsa Intifada to justify building the separation wall and annexing more Palestinian lands under the pretext of their right to defend themselves and their security against attacks and bombings.

### 1.3 The impact of the popular rampage on Israeli security

The Palestinian's popular rampage had effects on Israeli security that can be summarized as follows:

### 1.3.1 Increasing the security concern on the Israeli side:

This movement has increased the Israeli side's security concerns. The Israeli side refers to Israeli military forces and intelligence services and their security and military services, as the Israeli side has also tightened security measures at the Palestinian checkpoints. From the perspective of the Israeli side, any Palestinian citizen has become a danger to the Israelis because, according to rights organizations, he is "a suspect and could carry out a stabbing attack[24]."In addition, based on the 2014-2015 Palestinian Strategic Report, "the popular rampage and the run-down and shooting operations carried out by Palestinians in the West Bank, in the last quarter of 2015, caused confusion among Israeli decision-makers, and put the Israeli army in a new challenge that it has not encountered since the decline of the Al-Aqsa Intifada[25]."

### 1.3.2 Undermining security inside Israel and creating fear and terror within Israeli society:

This movement led to the destabilization of security and aroused fear and terror within Israeli society. Some Israeli citizens preferred to stay in their homes for fear of being stabbed. In reality, thousands of security calls were received, according to what the Israeli newspapers indicated to the Israeli police, as they suspected Palestinian civilians of carrying out stabbing attacks. Studies have also indicated that, on a personal level, the Israeli people feel that they are less secure than they have been in the previous fifty years[26]. This

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[23] Terrorism Against Israel: The Stabbing Intifada (October 2015 - Present), **Jewish Virtual Library website**, (W.D), available at: https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-stabbing-intifada, (Accessed at June 26, 2021)

[24] Israel/Palestine: Some Officials Backing 'Shoot-to-Kill' :Calls for Extrajudicial Killings of Palestinian Suspects Proliferate, **Human Rights Watch website**, (January 2, 2017) available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/02/israel/pale

stine-some-officials-backing-shoot-kill (Accessed at July 1, 2021)

[25] **The Palestinian Strategic Report 2014-2015**, in Mohsen Muhammad Salih (ed,), (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 2015), p. 97

[26] Israel/Palestine: Some Officials Backing 'Shoot-to-Kill' :Calls for Extrajudicial Killings of Palestinian Suspects Proliferate, **Human Rights Watch website**, (January 2, 2017) available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/02/israel/pale

movement will increase the citizens' insecurity and increase their fear if it continues.

### 1.3.3 Stirring fear and terror among the Israeli occupation soldiers:

In some cases, the soldiers mistakenly shot each other, or at other Jews, thinking they were Arabs[27].

### 1.3.4 The difficulty of assessing the security situation:

Due to the unpredictability of its results, its interruption and its spontaneity, this popular rampage led to the weakness of the ability of the Israeli intelligence service to detect stabbing operations in advance. The former head of the Shin Bet, Yupal Diskin, confirmed the inability to respond to these operations in intelligence[28]. Israel's head of Foreign Affairs and Parliamentary Security Committee Tsahi Hanghbi said it was no surprise that the Israeli security services were unable to eliminate the escalating situation in the West Bank, as they faced an uprising of unregulated individuals that was difficult to track. Unlike dealing with Palestinian organizations, considering that an easy task; since it is possible to control the infrastructure that provides these organizations with financial support and weapons[29].

Consequently, it was difficult to assess the security situation. the Palestinian arena was considered "the most disturbing in the short term[30]" for the Israeli army. Perhaps the explanation for considering it the most "worrying"

from the Israeli point of view because it constitutes a new and unfamiliar situation for Israel, and in order to confront it needs "an understanding of the deep currents operating in Palestinian society." Armies and intelligence services generally focus on two poles. A pole that includes the decision-makers and leadership systems of the opponent, and the second pole is its capabilities. The other party's deep currents are difficult to understand and are particularly disturbing[31].

### 1.3.5 Negative Impact on Israeli Economic Security:

The popular rampage negatively affected the Israeli economic security, as the appropriate security environment was not available in Israel for investment companies to operate, and this negatively affected the confidence of the Israeli consumer. By analyzing the figures reported by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics on Israeli consumer confidence, it can be said that the decline in Israeli consumer confidence seemed clear during the month following the outbreak of the rampage. Confidence declined from 24.95 in October 2015 to 19.05 in November, a month after the increase in the intensity of the popular rampage, wherein Israeli consumer confidence declined significantly. The figures indicating consumer confidence continued to decline to reach its lowest level during 2016 in July at 11.33, and the following table (1) shows more about the confidence of the Israeli public[32].

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stine-some-officials-backing-shoot-kill (Accessed at July 1, 2021)

[27] An Israeli injured by "friendly fire" in the West Bank, **Sky News**, February 24, 2016, available at: https://2u.pw/jGTwI (Accessed at June 20, 2021).
[28] A year after the Jerusalem Intifada, the circumstances of its emergence and opportunities for rise**, Al-Risala newspaper**, October 3, 2016, p. 5.
[29] Israeli official: We are facing an uprising of individuals, not organizations, Sawa News Agency, March 4, 2016, available at:

http://www.palsawa.com/news/2016/03/04/main/61307.html (Accessed at June 22, 2021).
[30] **The strategic source: a monthly translated bulletin from the Israeli research centers**, translated by Atallah al-Qumiri, Year 17, Issue 200 October 2016, p. 10.
[31] Ibid., p. 10.
[32] Consumer Confidence Survey, Consumer Confidence Indicator (Weighted Balance), Indicator Value, **Israeli Central Bureau Statistics**, October 13, 2016, available at: http://www.cbs.gov.il/ts/ID5228de80430ec3 (Accessed at June 27, 2021)

**Table (1) Israeli consumer confidence during 2015-2016**

| Year\Month | Amount of confidence |
|---|---|
| 2015-10 | -24.95 |
| 2015-11 | -19.05 |
| 2015-12 | -17.52 |
| 2016-01 | -16.00 |
| 2016-02 | -17.31 |
| 2016-03 | -13.71 |
| 2016-04 | -15.85 |
| 2016-05 | -12.88 |
| 2016-06 | -14.61 |
| 2016-07 | -11.33 |
| 2016-08 | -15.01 |
| 2016-09 | -14.51 |

Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics

This popular movement also affected the tourism sector in Israel.Severalf major investment companies have postponed their investments in Israel until calm returns and security is ensured, and this can be based on the impact of the tourism sector through the decline in tourism revenues from the stay of tourists in Israel for a period of one year, according to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics. This is shown in Table No. (2)[33].

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[33] Tourism And Accomodations Services-Departures And Returns Of Israelis-Departures And Returns, Total, **Israeli Central Bureau Statistics**, October 10, 2016 , available at: http://www.cbs.gov.il/ts/IDc8092e52570ed6/ (Accessed at June 27, 2021)

**Table (2) Total tourism returns for those who stayed in Israel for a year during 2015-2016**

| Period | Total tourism returns for those who stayed in Israel for a year |
|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 2015-01 | 289,153 |
| 2015-02 | 261,388 |
| 2015-03 | 345,818 |
| 2015-04 | 488,108 |
| 2015-05 | 413,969 |
| 2015-06 | 464,043 |
| 2015-07 | 669,839 |
| 2015-08 | 876,468 |
| 2015-09 | 643,308 |
| 2015-10 | 586,180 |
| 2015-11 | 319,889 |
| 2015-12 | 365,444 |
| 2016-01 | 335,251 |
| 2016-02 | 313,726 |
| 2016-03 | 391,105 |
| 2016-04 | 509,177 |
| 2016-05 | 528,655 |
| 2016-06 | 529,165 |
| 2016-07 | 782,824 |
| 2016-08 | 967,804 |
| 2016-09 | 748,282 |

Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics

**1.3.6 Hold the Israeli government responsible for the popular rampage and its impact on Israeli internal security:**

The outbreak of the popular rampage had affected the growing Israeli voices that hold the Israeli Government "Netanyahu Government" responsible for not protecting Israel's internal security. According to what was reported in the Israeli newspaper Maariv, the high blood price for Netanyahu's failure to deal with the "terror" of knives due to his government's refusal to resolve

the conflict, and for Netanyahu's refusal to discuss with Abu Mazen a settlement[34].

## 2.    Second Axis: the impact of the Palestinian mass uprising on the Israeli security strategy:

It is clear from what was previously discussed that the popular rampage had repercussions that affected Israeli security. In order to protect this security, Israel developed security strategies in dealing with the various Palestinian uprisings; however, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by the concept of strategy first.

### 1.2 Concept of strategy:

The concept of strategy has become one of the concepts circulating in our daily lives and there are many definitions of strategy. The interest of this study will not be to delve into the controversy over the different definitions of this concept, as much as it is concerned with defining the concept of the procedural security strategy intended in this analysis. In fact, what is intended here is Israel's attempt to prevent the dangers and accidents that affect its internal security through pre-prepared plans. The concept of strategy, or what is sometimes referred to as the science of planning, is a military concept concerned with war plans, and it is believed that the origin of the concept is Greek derived from the word 'strategos'[35].

Traditional security science referred to the concept of strategy as being concerned with planning and managing military operations before wars break out. In wars, countries usually follow a certain strategy in how they manage war battles. However, it may have to change its war strategy,

so either it works to rebuild it and changes its strategy drastically or completely, or it changes it partially, so it continues in some parts of its previously used strategy while changing others. Usually, countries change their old security strategy in whole or in part when they notice that that strategy, or in some of its parts, has become unable to achieve their security, and unable to meet the requirements of the current or future era in the light of many complex changes[36]. The strategy reflects predetermined plans for achieving a specific long-term goal in the light of available or accessible possibilities. Therefore, these plans or methods are developed to achieve a specific goal in the long term, depending on security plans and procedures in the use of available resources in the short term.

If the concept of strategy is concerned with states in terms of wars; planning and military procedures to achieve a specific goal and that mostly means protecting its national security. Consequently, the state's interest in developing strategic plans and procedures to protect its internal security is no less important. Israel, as an occupying state, pays great attention to maintaining its internal security by developing a security strategy, it may keep some of its parts or change them as it sees fit with the requirements of the new security situation and its variables.

### 2.2 An analysis of the Israeli security strategy in its dealings with the popular rampage:

Israel is keen to protect its national security to a great extent, and one of the strategic determinants of Israeli national security is the internal security determinants[37], therefore it pays immense efforts to protect it. In this regard, following the public rampage that had an impact on Israeli security as

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[34] Kobi Richter, "A 20% discount, and this costs us more," **Strategic Source: A monthly translated bulletin from the Israeli Research Centers**, translated by Atallah al-Qumiri, No. 8500, October 6, 2016, p. 13.

[35] Tendia D. Ndoro, Strategy & Organizational Sustainability in Intermediary Nonprofit Organizations: Understanding the Revenue Diversification Strategic Actions of Managerial Leadership in the small Business Development Centers (SBDCs), **A Ph.D dissertation**, Graduate

School-Newark, Rutgers- The State University of New Jersey, 2007, P. 8.

[36] Perry M. Smith, et al., **Creating Strategic Vision: Long- Range Planning for National Security**, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), P. xviii.

[37] Malik and Iman Darki, Determinants of the Israeli Security Strategy, **Master Thesis**, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Martyr Hama Lakhdar El Wadi, Algeria, 2017-2018, p. 44.

explained previously, there is a need to analyze its security strategy in its dealings with it.

If Israel was able to create in the past deterrence to face the traditional security challenges of conventional wars, regular armies, uprisings, or the outbreak of demonstrations that could be predicted and controlled; the biggest challenge that will face the security strategy of the Israeli army is how it can create deterrence against the popular rampage that began in 2015 and continues in 2016, even if it has subsided. The latter can be regarded as an emergency situation that poses a threat to Israeli security, and in emergency situations, the security strategy of the Israeli army is based on "removing all forms of security threats, by minimizing the damage that may be caused to the State of Israel[38]." Nonetheless, removing these threats will not be easy for Israel because of the difficulty in predicting or anticipating them. Israel, which in its security doctrine had adopted the "strategic warning[39]", which meant that it had an intelligence capability that could give early warning of threats had failed to predict the occurrence of operations that took place during the popular rampage in advance.

It can therefore be said that the popular rampage posed a security challenge faced by Israel, and Israel is usually changing its strategy depending on the security challenges it faces, in order to provide its security and the security of Israelis and settlers. It is noted that Israel, following the recent Al-Aqsa Intifada and the spread of the phenomenon of bombing operations inside Israel, and in order to suppress this phenomenon; one of its security strategies was to build the separation wall to reduce the number of attacks. The goal behind building the wall, as

stipulated in the Israeli government's decision on July 23, 2001, is security, and it comes as a response from the State of Israel to the suicide bombers[40].

Regardless of the other political goals of the Israeli government from the wall, the security strategy adopted by the Israeli security establishment was to protect the security of Israel and its citizens with the aim of limiting the bombing attacks that spread after the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

The security strategy during this rampage, which Israel is considering to implement, differed from its strategy in the Al-Aqsa Intifada in providing its citizens with security from bombings through the wall. This time, there were stabbing attacks, so it can be considered that the most important internal security challenge that Israel faced during 2015-2016 was the popular rampage, which will call upon Israel to develop a security strategy that is compatible with the non-recurrence of stabbing attacks in the future, or at least limiting such operations. This will prompt the Israeli security establishment to formulate a security strategy that suits the challenges posed by the popular rampage, the most important of which is the lack of expectation of such operations. Other crucial new changes to the Israeli security strategy after the popular uprising can be described as follows:

### 2.2.1 Tightening the security grip on Israeli checkpoints through monitoring devices:

During 2017, Israel continued to tighten the security grip on the Israeli checkpoints and deploy surveillance devices and cameras[41], but at the same time, it will maintain a pivotal security role through security coordination. Some Palestinian factions had alerted to the security danger caused

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[38] The Israeli Army, **The Israeli Army's Strategy**, in Adnan Abu Amer (Translator), Al-Zaytoonah Translation Series (79), (Beirut: Al-Zaytouna Center for Studies and Consultations, 2015), p. 15.

[39] Maher Al-Sharif, The Israeli Security Doctrine and Israel's Wars in the Last Decade, **Institute for Palestine Studies**, (B.T), p. 12. Available at: http://www.palestinestudies.org/sites/default/files/uploads/images/alaqeeda.pdf (Accessed at June 14, 2021).

[40] **The separation wall in the West Bank and its humanitarian impact on Palestinian communities: East Jerusalem, Report No. 7**, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs - OCHA Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2007, p. 6.

[41] Surveillance cameras, camouflaged devices that monitor the resistance fighters in the West Bank, **Al-Majd**, (B, C), available at: https://almajd.ps/news6720/ (Accessed at June 6, 2021)

by these surveillance devices and cameras, calling on Palestinian youth in the West Bank to destroy private surveillance cameras installed on roads and inside Palestinian cities. Describing these cameras as the "fastest agent", it warned of the necessity of erasing the content of the cameras that Palestinians use for surveillance and protection purposes on their shops and homes[42].

### 2.2.2 Counterattack:

The public rampage will call Israel to a new security strategy, different from the old security strategy used in previous Palestinian uprisings. Perhaps this new strategy will keep some elements of the old security strategy theory, where the old security strategy theory can be subject to changes. One of these changes may be the switch to a counter-attack method, and perhaps the best evidence of the beginning of this method is the killing operations that Israel is doing at the checkpoints on the pretext that they intend to carry out a stabbing operation, as happened in the process of liquidating a girl from the village of Asira at the Za'tara checkpoint, which the soldiers accused of trying to carry out an operation Stabbed despite denying the accounts of eyewitnesses in the place[43].

### 2.2.4 Reassure the Israeli public of their security:

Because of the increasing cases of terror and fear within Israeli society following the popular rampage, Israel tends to follow a new security strategy that relies in one of its determinants to reassure the Israeli public of its security so that the security establishment will take over that task. The IDF recently released its strategy to the Israeli public out of a desire to explain in what form it intends to achieve its goal in defending the state of Israel[44]. It is clear that what the Israeli army has done in publishing its security strategy, which it intends to implement to reassure the Israeli public of its security, and this is evident through the projection of the capabilities and energies of the Israeli army compared to the capabilities of other armies in the Middle East or in any part of the world. This comparison is summarized by showing the superiority of the Israeli army compared to others in terms of air, intelligence, sea, and land superiority, and even its superiority in the electronic dimension. The main concepts on which the Israeli army relied and which have served the state of Israel well over the years in its work were "deterrence, danger, strength and security[45]."

### 2.2.5 Replacement of Israel's security strategy "cauterization of consonance" of collective punishment with individual punishment

There are security concepts related to the Israeli combat doctrine, including "**cauterization** of consonance" and "Lawn mowers". The first concept, which was created by Moshe Ya'alon, the former Minister of Defense during the "Al-Aqsa Intifada", is based on directing crushing strikes against both the Palestinian armed resistance and the civilian population, i.e. the use of collective punishment of the civilian population to punish the resistance and to the civilian population alike, so that both the resistance and the civilian population realize That Israel cannot be defeated, and that the resistance is futile and its consequences are dire. As for the second concept, it means that the war will be repeated whenever it seems that the "grass" will grow, meaning an increase in the capabilities of the combative resistance, especially its missile arsenal[46].

Furthermore, it is noted that Israel has changed its security strategy in dealing with the popular rampage from its predecessors by easing somewhat its collective punishment operations against the Palestinians, or what it called

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[42] The West Bank does not calm down: Successive stabbing attacks, **Al-Akhbar**, issue, 2711 October 9, 2015, http://www.al-akhbar.com/node/243575 (Accessed at June 12, 2021).

[43] The martyrdom of a girl from North Asira and the injury of a young man and a soldier during clashes in Balata refugee camp, **Al-Quds newspaper**, October 20, 2016, p. 1.

[44] **The strategic source: a monthly translated bulletin from the Israeli research centers**, Op.Cit, p. 11.

[45] Ibid, p. 11.

[46] Maher Al Sharif, The Israeli Security Doctrine and Israel's Wars in the Last Decade, Op. Cit., p. 4.

"awareness raising," so it was keen to keep this rampage in an individual framework to punish the perpetrators of the stabbing attacks so that its impact does not extend to the rest of the Palestinians. According to Shlomo Brom, a strategic analyst at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, he believes that the successive stabbings carried out by Palestinians against Israelis "that, unlike the previous intifada, Israel has succeeded in isolating terrorists from their societies rather than applying collective punishment and further inflaming the tensions that stimulate revenge attacks[47].

However, although Israel has somewhat reduced collective punishment following stabbings by perpetrators, it has not fully abolished it. This can be inferred through the request of the head of the enemy Government, Benjamin Netanyahu from the legal adviser of the Israeli Government to consider the possibility of removing the families of Palestinian perpetrators to the Gaza Strip against the backdrop of a stabbing operation by citizens in the Har Brakha settlement, near the city of Nablus[48]." "The removal of Palestinian terrorists to the Gaza Strip will reduce terrorist operations against the State of Israel and its citizens." However, Israeli media said that the success of this initiative was uncertain, given that the government's legal adviser, Avichai Mandelblit, had confirmed his opposition to the removal of families, noting that it was "an illegal process in accordance with Israeli and international laws". Any form of collective punishment is illegal, and, in this case; an attempt to punish the relatives of those perpetrators who have not been charged with anything is a complete breach of international law and the Geneva Convention.

## 2.2.6 Use of social networks

Israel deliberately changes its security strategy when it finds that its old security strategy has become incapable of fulfilling its security and the requirements of the current era; which it did after the public rampage, due to the recent development of the use of social networks in a large way by the Palestinians to spy on the Palestinians. It is noted that Israel has introduced social networks into its security strategy to meet the requirements of the current era. An Israeli study indicated that social networks and the new media play a central role in "incitement to carry out Palestinian attacks against Israelis, especially by the rising Palestinian generation, confirming that these networks contribute to igniting the security situation in the Palestinian territories[49]."

The Israeli Army Radio also stated that the police, according to Netanyahu's instructions, will form a specialized team who are fluent in the Arabic language to detect Palestinian youths through social networks and know their intentions before they carry out operations against Israel. The radio indicated that the instructions came based on what was written by a number of suicide bombers on their personal pages before leaving. According to the aforementioned, it appears that Israel has deliberately incorporated social networks into its new security strategy, in an attempt to track down those who indicate on their social media pages that they intend to carry out a stabbing attack[50].

## 2.2.7 Tightening security precautions during Jewish holidays

Israel usually follows a strategy during the Jewish holidays by tightening its security precautions, and it seems that Israel did not change its security strategy, but rather continued with that strategy

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[47] Shira Rubin, Palestinian stabs Israeli after five-week lull in attacks**, USA TODAY**, 11 August , 2016, Available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/11/palestinian-stabs-israeli-attack/88557268/ (Accessed at 11 September 2021)

[48] Two resistance fighters carried out a double stabbing attack in the settlement of "Har Bracha" near the city of Nablus, injuring two Israeli soldiers with moderate injuries, **Al-Akhbar**, Issue

2828, Thursday, March 3, 2016, available at: http://al-akhbar.com/node/253418 ( Accessed at December 14, 2021)

[49] Maariv: Social media ignites Palestinian attacks, **Al-Jazeera news website**, September 28, 2016, available at: https://2u.pw/xwhke (Accessed at July 2, 2021).

[50] The West Bank does not calm down: successive stabbing attacks, Op.Cit.

after the public rampage; according to its security calculations, stabbing attacks increase with the approach of the Jewish holiday. Therefore, Israel has intensified its security measures, especially at the checkpoints whenever there is an approaching Jewish holidays. This is evident from the tightening of Israel's security measures and its closure of checkpoints in Jerusalem and the occupied West Bank, which prompted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to "increase the number of army and police personnel in them[51]."

## Study results and recommendations

Relying in this regard on the approach of change and continuity, this study presented an analysis of the impact of the Palestinian's popular rampage launched in October 2015 on Israeli security to verify the continuity of Israel's dependence on its old security strategies or its change.

The study concluded that one of the most important characteristics of the Palestinian's popular rampage was its spontaneity, bloodiness, and its unexpected results. In this respect, Israel has adopted in its security doctrine the "strategic warning"; which means that it possesses an intelligence capacity that can give an early warning of the dangers and threats. In the case of the Palestinian's popular rampage, the strategic warning will not be able to fulfill the purpose, as it is cannot allow knowing when a Palestinian citizen might launch a stabbing operation against the Israelis, beside the fact that one of its main characteristics is the major violation of Palestinian human security. Moreover, among the most important results that have been reached is that the public rampage had an impact on Israeli security. The study found that it led to an increase in security concerns on the Israeli side and that it had caused destabilization of security inside Israel, let alone fear and terror among Israeli society and the occupation soldiers. It also led to negative effects on Israeli economic security; as the appropriate security environment was not available in Israel

for the work of investment companies. This negatively affected the confidence of the Israeli consumer, and negatively influenced the tourism sector in Israel. Several major investment companies have also postponed their investments in "Israel" until calm returns and security is assured. Another impact of this popular rampage is the increase in Israeli voices that held the Israeli government responsible for failing to protect Israeli internal security.

With regard to the Israeli security strategy, the study concluded that the Palestinian's popular rampage led Israel to change its security strategy according to new matters so that it can maintain its security; while it continued in some parts its dependence on the old Israeli security strategy in which it dealt with the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Among the changes that Israel has made to its security strategy in dealing with the Palestinian's popular rampage is the tightening of the security grip on Israeli checkpoints through monitoring devices. Although tightening the security grip on Israeli checkpoints was part of the old security strategy, the change in this matter was the introduction of surveillance devices and cameras at the checkpoints. Another change that Israel made to its new security strategy was the introduction of a counterattack, following this method by carrying out several killings at the checkpoints, under the pretext that they intended to carry out a stabbing attack.

Among the new changes that Israel followed in its new security strategy was to reassure the Israeli public of its security by publishing its strategy to the Israeli public. Furthermore, Israel had changed its old security strategy concerning the concept of "cauterization of conscience" based on collective punishment; yet, it somewhat eased the operations of collective punishment it exercises against the Palestinians. Hence, Israel was keen to keep this rampage in an individual framework specifically to punish the perpetrators of the stabbing operations, and not to extend the impact on the rest of the Palestinians. Equally important, and, in order to adapt to the requirements of the times, Israel was obliged to incorporate social media into

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[51] The Rise in Operations in Jerusalem and Hebron, **Al-Akhbar**, Issue 2988, Tuesday,

September 20, 2016, available at: https://2u.pw/Fnd2j (Accessed at June 12, 2021)

its security strategy. One of the things that Israel has continued in its old security strategy is to further tighten security precautions during the Jewish holidays.

## Study recommendations:

Based on the findings reached, the study recommends for future studies further research on many other aspects of the public endowment that have not been addressed in this study, especially in relation to events taking place in Jerusalem. It also recommends that further studies be conducted on Israel's security strategy towards the Palestinian people after the events of the Sheikh Jarrah neighbourhood in Jerusalem to see where it continues with its security strategy and where it has changed.

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